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Reapportionment and
Judicial Responsibilities
A talk before the Legal Club of Chicago,
April 8, 1963
By PHIL C. NEAL
Professor of Law and Dean of The Law School
The question with which I should like to worry you for
a few minutes this evening is this: As lawyers and as
citizens (but not as Republicans or Democrats, city dwell­
ers or suburbanites) what are we to think of the role the
courts are playing or are trying to play in the reappor­
tionment of the state legislatures? Should we applaud or
should we deplore? May we accept it as a new and proper
phase in the fulfillment of the historic role of courts in
our system, or must we receive such benefits as it may
produce with misgivings if not with alarm? As to whether
it is useful or important for us to consider this question
I say nothing. I suggest only that it is an interesting
question.
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I hesitate to state the issue more precisely than I have
done because it is. the kind of problem which can hardly
be reduced to a narrow proposition and in the end calls
more for intuition than for analysis. It is possible, how­
ever, to frame the area of uncertainty by recalling some
competing social insights which wise and eloquent mas­
ters. in our field have given us. We might start, for ex­
ample, with Justice Frankfurter's admonition in Baker v.
Carr itself, in his dissenting opinion: "In a democratic
society like ours, relief must come through an aroused
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives." And alongside this we might put Judge
Learned Hand's similar declaration of belief, uttered in a
different but surely not irrelevant context:
"
... This much
I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit
of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society
where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a
society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon
courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end
will perish."
Bu then on the other edge of the same field of vision
we must admit the possible force of Professor Freund's
gentle rejoinder to Judge Hand's proposition: "The
question is not whether courts can do everything but
whether they can do something." And although we may
doubt that Mr. Justice Holmes would have favored judi­
cial intervention in legislative apportionment, we must
bear in mind the possible relevance of his observation that
"the felt necessities of the time" have had much to do
with the course the law has taken, and that "The sub­
stance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corre­
sponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood
to be convenient." Finally, I find at least somewhat ar­
resting the remark made to me by a distinguished lawyer
who has himself had more than a small role in the current
reapportionment controversy. Commenting on a piece of
mine which criticized the Supreme Court's position in
Baker u, Carr, he said: "Much of the academic world
seems to me to have far too little appreciation of the
depth and force of the currents on which the Court is
riding.... I am inclined to believe that many of the prob­
lems we now regard as conventional were once even more
baffling than these."
It is the depth and force of the currents, perhaps, that
give this particular question of judicial responsibility
whatever special importance and interest it may have.
How should a court respond to strong currents?
It will also help mark out the contours and dimensions
of our question, I think, to see just what the problem of
reapportionment is, leaving aside the question of the ap­
propriate means to achieve it. The inability to compel
representatives of thinly populated districts to surrender
their powers over state legislatures amounts to nothing
less than the breakdown of the existing foundations of
government. What it means is that the built-in mech-
anisms for adjusting the distribution of political power
have failed. If resort to judicial help is really necessary-'
if neither legislative act nor popular initiative nor consti­
tutional amendment nor constitutional convention is
possible because of the rural hold on key parts of the
machinery-then the existing constitution has failed. The
transfer of political power must be accomplished outside
the established processes. In short, the government must
be reconstituted.
The term "revolution" is too strongly associated with
violence to be appropriate here, I suppose, but it has other
implications that are relevant. We really have no word
for the peaceful substitution of a new frame of govern­
ment for an old, by procedures not provided for in the
old. In dealing with the southern states after the Civil
War we called it reconstruction. What was it when the
men of Philadelphia in 1789, departing from their man­
date, decided to substitute a new constitution for the
Articles of Confederation and when. that new constitu­
tion went into effect by the ratification process prescribed
in the document itself? Is it not that kind of transition
which the courts. are being asked to bridge in the current
reapportionment litigation?
I do not overlook the point that, as the case is. put, it
is the Federal Constitution which provides the continuity,
support and command. I mean only to stress the funda­
mental nature of the function which the courts are being
called upon to perform. Should they respond?
Certainly there are strong reasons on. the side of saying
they should not. Mention of two must suffice, though
there are others. The first is that there is no body of law
which points the way toward how a state legislature
should be reconstructed, and little likelihood that any
satisfactory body of law can emerge from the present liti­
gation. The often-asserted principle of "one man, one
vote" gives no recognition to the equally important prin­
ciple of adequate representation for minority interests,
furnishes no guidance on such crucial problems as the
size of the legislative body and the drawing of district
boundaries, and is capable of producing quite arbitrary
restrictions on the framing of state political processes. We
would not think of espousing it, for example, as the con­
trolling rule for determining representation in the United
Nations.
No other principles which a court might declare have
been suggested or seem likely to be. It is true that the
Supreme Court might find the problem easier for itself
than I have indicated. It might, for example, limit itself
to deciding that a state's representation scheme was "un­
fair,". and avoid the difficult question of what would be
a fair plan by remanding to the lower court with that
convenient directive, "for further proceedings not incon­
sistent with this opinion.'" But the problems will not seem
that simple to the lower courts.
And this brings me to a second reason against judicial
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attempts to deal with reapportionment. As a practical
matter, what can a court do?
It cannot, I assume, compel a legislature to enact, a
constitutional convention to propose, or the people to ini­
tiate a new plan of representation. Its choices seem lim­
ited to admonishing the existing legislature or arranging
for the election of a new one. Unless the threat of the
second is genuine, the first seems likely to be futile or to
produce only the mildest kind of self-correction. The ul­
timate power which the courts are necessarily invoking
(and have in some instances already exercised) is the
power to create a new legislature, not merely the power
to invalidate a law. So drastic an assertion of judicial su­
premacy would perhaps seem less offensive to democratic
principles if the judicial plan of reapportionment could
at least be submitted to ratification by the people, as would
a new plan of representation framed by, let us say, a
constitutional convention. But to condition a judicial de­
cree on popular approval would, of course, be offensive
to our notions of the independence of courts and the
integrity of the judicial function. Is there not a lesson,
perhaps, in this dilemma? Does it not suggest that there
may be more importance in the concept of separation of
powers than it is fashionable these days to believe?
Th{s issue of principle aside, courts concerned with the
vitality of the judicial function must give at least some
heed to the possibility that what they command may in
the end have to be enforced. I have not so far seen signs
of serious resistance to judicial orders in apportionment
cases, and I think we should hope there will be none. But
must we not recognize as a possibility that somewhere,
sometime, one of these cases may result in a contest for
control of a legislative chamber between a group of rep­
resentatives elected under federal court order and a group
elected under the laws of the state? Unlikely as that may
be, I think it is not irrelevant to consider whether in such
an event we would expect to see the proceedings dictated
by federal marshals armed with contempt citations, or
entrance to the statehouse controlled by federal soldiers
armed with bayonets. Judicial power is at its strongest
where it brings the force of the entire community behind
a judgment of individual right or individual wrong based
on recognizable legal principles which in turn have the
sanction of community ethics. It is at its weakest, surely,
when it seeks to resolve the conflicting interests of large
groups in the community by enforcing mass compliance
with a judgment not based on established legal rules or
a great moral principle. It is hard not to believe that if
judicial � _ -ver in apportionment cases were ever put to
the ultimate test it would end in judicial defeat.
So much for the negative side of the question. There is
of course another side, as I tried to indicate at the outset.
Perhaps the most appealing point to be made in favor of
judicial intervention in reapportionment, and I have no
doubt the consideration most influential with the Supreme
Court, was the argument of necessity. No matter how
difficult or novel the task, and despite some rather nebu­
lous risks or costs to the purity of the judicial function
(the argument implied), courts should act because all
other avenues were closed. Judicial action was necessary
to unlock the situation and release the pent-up democratic
energies which would then take over the process of re­
form. A second point which should now be made, I sup­
pose, is that it is difficult to argue with success. There
can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Carr has touched off a wave of activity and
brought about, or is in the process of bringing about,
legislative revision on a broad front. I do not think we
know how substantial this will turn out to be, but for the
moment there is certainly reason to believe that Baker v.
Carr will indeed prove to have shifted materially the
basis of power in our state legislatures.
It is about at this point that analysis must give way and
let intuition take over. How shall we appraise these argu­
ments in favor of judicial reapportionment and how shall
we weigh them against the vague and impalpable costs?
Whatever one says must rest largely on speculation. As
to the impossibility of reapportionment without judicial
help, my own speculation is that the obstacles to reform
were exaggerated. I am sceptical that a determined and
organized political majority can indefinitely be denied its
proper voice in the state legislature. In Illinois, of course,
the reapportionment of 1954 came about shortly after the
courts had rejected efforts to obtain judicial help. My
examination of the record in Baker v. Carr does not con­
vince me that the failure to reapportion in Tennessee
represented more than the rather easy rejection of desul­
tory efforts to obtain new legislation.
I suspect that in general the rural domination of state
legislatures has continued not in the face of the kind of
"aroused popular conscience" of which Justice Frank­
furter spoke, but in the face of the same sort of apathy
that permits corrupt machines to dominate city politics
and inefficiency to dominate the administration of govern­
ment. Indeed, it is possible to read the success of Baker v.
Carr as confirmation of this point of view. To the extent
that reapportionment has already occurred, it is hard to
account for in terms of the coercive power of the courts,
although uncertainty about what that coercive power
might turn out to be has no doubt had some part in the
process. Is it not likely, however, that the most important
contribution of Baker v. Carr has been its polemic force?
It has focused attention on the problem, brought into the
open a widespread consensus as to the need for reform,
and helped create a momentum for change which legis­
lators find hard to deny-in short, it has itself helped gen­
erate the "aroused popular conscience which sears the
conscience of the people's representatives."
In the end, perhaps, one's views of Baker V'. Carr must
turn on whether one believes that arousing the popular
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conscience is a proper responsibility of courts, independent
of their function of deciding cases. I may conclude by
echoing, with variations, same themes suggested earlier:
If the currents of reform are deep enough and strong
enough, a court need nat ride them but need only divert
them into their proper channel; but if a court chooses to
ride them, or perhaps to generate them, we must hope
that it will have vision to see that there may be rocks and
shoals ahead. We must also hope that by enjoying the
heady satisfactions of riding these currents the court is nat
encouraging the people to surrender their democratic
responsibilities to officials appointed far life.
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The reuicu/ which follows appeared in The Decalogue Journal,
Volume 13, Number 1, September-October, 1962, and is reprinted
here with the gracious permission of that publication and of the
author.
As a gesture of honor to Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz of
the Illinois Appellate Court upan the occasion of his 75th
birthday, his opinions have been edited and compiled by
Louis A. Kahn and Edward R. Lev of the Chicago Bar,
and published by the judge's brothers. This compilation
is, however, no inconsequential presentation piece issued
by a "vanity press"; it is a volume which merits a place of
respect an the shelves of any library.
The mast immediate and obvious characteristic of
Judge Schwartz's opinions is their facility of expression
and felicity of allusion. Their literary grace makes them
genuinely pleasing to read. They tend to be written in
what Professor Llewellyn! has termed the "Grand Style"
of opinion writing, as contrasted with the "Formal Style";
in Llewellyn's terminology, this suggests no grandiose­
ness but means that the opinion places its legal problem
and the pertinent rules in proper perspective in the factual
situation and discusses the social and legal considerations
relevant to the decision and to the development of a use­
ful rule. Other attributes-of deeper significance than lit­
erary lustre-that characterize and pervade Judge
Schwartz's opinions are his concern with the effect of the
opinion upan the society, his focus upan the social utility
of the law, and his constant concern with improving the
manner of rendering justice. This concern is illustrated by
his many trenchant suggestians far revising rules or
statutes which he deems outmoded or unwise; it is par­
ticularly well epitomized by his opinion in Gray v. Gray,2
which has been praised and quoted at length in Delay in
the Courts, by Messrs. Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, who
state that Judge Schwartz puts his paint "eloquently" and
"with special farce" in an opinion which is a "notable
judicial essay an the problem of court congestion and the
concentration of the trial bar."
Judge Schwartz's opinions indicate clearly his belief
that the judge should play an active and enlightened role
in the growth and development of the law, within the
interstitial area in which it is proper far a judge to "make
law." He recognizes that the judge does nat have full free­
dam of action, when he states:" "This is nat a matter in­
valving method or practice or those interstices of the law
where courts have latitude. A court is nat the forum to
consider the effect of the proposed new type of litigation
upan the marital status and mold its opinion ta farm a
public policy sa determined. Public opinion cannot be
consulted by a court nor can social investigators be en­
gaged ta inquire into such matters. We must adhere to
the mare traditional method of construction." He has a
decent respect far precedent, a good craftsman's under­
standing of it, and a willingness to deal openly with it;
but he is nat hobbled or paralyzed by it.
In Eich v. Perk Dog Food CO.,4 a case of first impres­
sian in Illinois, he upheld the right of privacy in an eru­
dite opinion examining the right of privacy in its legal,
social, and historical aspects. The Eick opinion states,
page 37, "But even if we grant defendants' paint of view
that the right of privacy has no foundation in ancient
common law, it does nat follow that we should deny
plaintiff's right to recavery. To deny relief because of
lack of precedent is to freeze the common law as of a par­
ticular date.... With changing times rigidity can often
mean injustice."
With similar flexibility and perspicacity, Judge
Schwartz held that the doctrine which denies indemnity
between tortfeasors is inapplicable where the liability of
one tortfeasor is primary and active and the ather sec­
ondary and passive." "The principle of no contributions
and no indemnity between all joint tortfeasors is mare a
rule of ethics than a principle of law. The law simply
closed its door to the inter se disputes of those wham it
considered to be bad men. This originated at a time when
torts were in the main such wrongs as slander, libel, and
assault and battery. Today, torts are mainly the incidents
of industry and transportation, To continue to apply the
rule to such cases as that before us would make the law no
jealous mistress, but a squeamish damsel, refusing to have
anything to do with a couple of respectable suitors because
her grandfather once told her they were joint tortfeasors."
That his participation in the development of the law is
conscious and sophisticated is indicated by such statements
as: "This is haw the doctrine emerges from the cases
which have considered it. That this is the common method
far the development of our law and represents its unique
